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ECONOMIC FUTURE
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I. Introduction
In December, 1984, following two years of negotiations, the British Govern-
ment and the Government of the People's Republic of China signed a treaty
outlining the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese government in 1997 [1].
Hong Kong's economic success and status as an international financial center
undoubtedly will be affected by the Sino-British Agreement. This article
examines the Agreement in light of its future impact upon the Hong Kong
economy.
Hong Kong's unique historical background and recent economic develop-
ment will be examined, in the following section, in order to place the
Agreement in its proper context [2]. The basic provisions of the Agreement will
be introduced in section 3 of this article [3] and a discussion of the Agreement's
impact on Hong Kong's governmental and legal structures will be presented in
sections 4 and 5 [4].
Section 6 examines specific sectors of the Hong Kong economy that are
likely to be affected by the Agreement [5]. These sectors include the invest-
ment, trade, manufacturing, and shipping industires. The concerns voiced by
business leaders and their reactions to the Agreement will also be addressed.
Finally, future implementation of the Agreement and China's role in adminis-
tering Hong Kong will be discussed [6].
This article is intended to demonstrate that uncertainty will continue to
characterize Hong Kong's future economy. On the one hand, the Agreement's
ambiguities and China's unpredictable political and economic future present
legitimate sources of concern for Hong Kong's business leaders. On the other
hand, China's recent drive toward modernization and rapid economic develop-
ment, coupled with its demand for foreign capital and technology, augur well
for Hong Kong's economy. In the final analysis, a more accurate assessment of
Hong Kong's future must await the advent of 1997, the year the Agreement
goes into effect.
* J.D. candidate, 1986, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
0167-9333/85/$3.30 ( 1985, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
T.S. Macdntyre / Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong
2. Factual setting
This section describes "one of the world's most remarkable economic
achievements" [7]: Hong Kong's economy. The colony has assumed an im-
portant role in international business and finance. Resolution of Hong Kong's
future status has therefore emerged as an "international dilemma" [8]. An
examination of Hong Kong's economy, and its international aspects will
provide a useful background to analysis of the Agreement's impact.
The Agreement and the current dilemma involving Hong Kong's future are
the culmination of unique historical developments. This section briefly ex-
plores the historical background, focusing on the treaties which led to the
negotiated Agreement between China and Great Britain. Because Hong Kong's
history has been linked with China's, recent developments in China will also be
examined.
2.1. Hong Kong's economy
Hong Kong has risen from a relatively insignificant port, once used only by
British shipping, to the world's third largest financial center [9]. The growth of
Hong Kong's economy in the post-World War II era is of international
consequence. Hong Kong's prosperity has transformed it into "a vital force in
generating the prosperity of the newly-industrialized countries of the East" [10]
and "a key to the well-being of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim" [11].
Hong Kong's economic success is primarily a phenomenon of the last thirty
years [12]. The initial stimulus to its economic growth was burgeoning world
demand for Chinese manufactured exports, particularly low-priced textiles
[13]. The colony's Net Domestic Product (NDP) [14] reflects the economy's
explosive growth: the NDP increased from 6.8% annual growth in the 1950s to
9.6% in the 1960s [15].
Since the 1970s, Hong Kong's economy has continued to diversify. While
exports have remained strong, domestic demand has assumed importance as an
economic mainstay [16]. From 1976 to 1982 employment in trade, services, the
financial sector and government increased at a compound rate of eight percent
[17]. These increases reflect rapid growth in banking, tourism, and financial
sectors [18]. The past decade has been a period of great change for Hong
Kong's economy. Preeminent among these changes has been increasing inter-
national involvement in Hong Kong banking, real estate, and equity markets
[19] as well as the rise of a group of successful, indigenous Chinese investors
[20].
The growth of a skilled labor pool has led to the emergence of a service
sector in Hong Kong's economy [21]. This development and the growth of
domestic demand within the colony have combined to transform Hong Kong's
economy from one based on manufactured exports into a diversified, interna-
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tional trade and financial center. The colony's relative political stability and its
liberal, pro-business policies have proved to be a profitable combination: from
1960 to 1979, Hong Kong's NDP outperformed all other world economies [22].
2.2. The historical roots
Hong Kong became a British colony in the nineteenth century after Great
Britain executed several treaties with the Imperial Chinese Government [23].
England was able to exploit the inability of Chinese leaders to deal effectively
with an industrialized society. Because the Chinese conception of law was
rooted in Confucian philosophy, its leaders were ill-equipped to protect China
against the exploitative policies of a Western European power [24].
China's early relations with Great Britain, after it opened its borders to
foreign trade, revealed its inability to repel European imperialism [25]. China's
objections to Britain's importation of opium were met with military force
during the Opium War [26]. Britain's military victory enabled it to obtain
Chinese concessions in the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded Hong Kong Island
to Great Britain in perpetuity [27]. The 1860 Convention of Peking granted
Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island to Britain [28]. Finally, the 1898
Convention of Peking granted a ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories
to Britain [29].
During the period between its defeat in the Opium War and the ascendance
of the Communist Party in 1949, China remained a relatively weak state.
Western nations exploited it for territory, influence, and trade concessions
because China had neither a powerful central authority nor a sizable military
force [30]. This century of exploitation and humiliation left a legacy of Chinese
resentment toward the West.
After thirty years of Communist Party rule characterized by isolation from
international relations [311, China recently resumed active participation in
international trade and politics [321. The displacement of Mao Zedong's
policies and Deng Xiaoping's ascendance to power have led to a new emphasis
in Chinese politics [33]. Mao's revolutionary ideology has yielded to the
pragmatism of Deng and his contemporaries. Deng's plan, known as the Four
Modernizations, aims to transform China by the year 2000 into a modern state
with modern agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technol-
ogy [34]. Deng advocates a "market socialism" approach to China's moderni-
zation: a combination of market mechanisms and centralized planning, which
favors both increased autonomy for production units and increased consumer-
ism [35].
One means of implementing this policy has been the establishment of
Special Economic Zones (zones) [36]. These zones are governed by semi-au-
tonomous local governments which have provided special tax breaks and other
economic incentives to lure foreign capital [37]. Since their establishment, the
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zones have attracted billions of dollars of foreign investment and sophisticated
foreign technology [38]. The success of these zones has prompted China to
open fourteen coastal cities to foreign investment [39]. These cities have also
benefited from the increased foreign investment through rapid development of
the cities' infrastructure and heavy industry [40].
During Mao's leadership, official Chinese iolicy on Hong Kong remained a
paradox. While China denounced the treaties as "unequal" and invalid and
declared Hong Kong to be Chinese territory [41]. China nevertheless accepted
British administration of the territory as its lawful government [42]. In contrast
to Mao, however, Deng Xiaoping and his contemporaries have adopted a more
consistent policy on the question of Hong Kong's future. They have linked the
acquisition of Hong Kong to their drive to modernize China [43]. Since 1979,
they have acted quickly in negotiating the Agreement in order to speed
modernization of China's economy [44].
3. The Agreement
After the United Kingdom first announced in mid-1982 that it would begin
negotiating with China over Hong Kong's future, there was much speculation
over the content of any agreement between the two nations [45]. This specula-
tion centered on the future of Hong Kong's capitalist economy under Chinese
administration. The basic provisions of the Agreement, discussed below along
with initial reactions to the Agreement, seek to preserve Hong Kong's capitalist
economy while granting the former colony a certain degree of political au-
tonomy [46].
The Agreement guarantees that "Hong Kong's previous capitalist system
and life-style shall remain unchanged for fifty years" [47]. China not only
pledges to allow capitalism to continue after 1997, but also promises to pass a
law guaranteeing that "the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be
practiced" in Hong Kong [48]. Under the authority of its Constitution and
pursuant to the Agreement, China will establish in 1997 the "Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China" (Hong
Kong SAR) [49]. The Agreement specifies that the Hong Kong SAR's govern-
ment will be "composed of local inhabitants" [50] and will be free to "decide
its economic and trade policies on its own" [51].
Hong Kong's future legal system will be established after China's National
People's Congress enacts a "Basic Law" for the Hong Kong SAR [52]. The
Basic Law will resemble a constitution; only laws enacted in accordance with
the Basic Law will be regarded as "valid" [53]. Existing laws will be preserved
as long as they do not conflict with the Basic Law [54].
Key sectors of Hong Kong's thriving economy are covered by the Agree-
ment's guarantees. The Agreement seeks to preserve Hong Kong's status as an
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international financial center [55]: "[m]arkets for foreign exchange, gold,
securities, and futures shall continue" [56]. The Hong Kong dollar will remain
a freely convertible currency after 1997 [57]. Hong Kong will retain its status
as a major trading center and free port [58].
The Hong Kong SAR will have a high degree of autonomy with the ability
to enter into international agreements [59]. The exact scope of Hong Kong's
future ability to conduct its own foreign affairs, however, is unclear [60].
Hong Kong's internal revenues [61] will not be redistributed to the main-
land; the Agreement guarantees that Hong Kong will be "a separate customs
territory" [621. Finally, Hong Kong SAR citizens will enjoy freedom from
travel restrictions, thus enabling local business persons to maintain their
international trade relationships [631.
Reactions to the Agreement's guarantees have been mixed. When it was first
announced in the summer of 1984 that China had agreed to maintz'-i Hong
Kong's capitalist economy, Hong Kong's Hang Seng stock index jumped
almost sixty-seven points [64]. During the height of uncertainty over Hong
Kong's future, American and Japanese investments in the colony greatly
increased [65]. Despite the concerns of some local Hong Kong business persons
[66], observers are generally pleased with the Agreement and predict continued
expansion for Hong Kong's economy [67].
4. Impact of the Agreement on Hong Kong's current government
The Agreement addresses two important concerns of Hong Kong's business
community. The first concern is the role China will play in administering Hong
Kong [68]. The second concern involves the degree of government regulation of
private business [69].
Hong Kong's current government structure is decidedly undemocratic:
"[t]here are no directly elected members of the central organs of government"
[70]. Hong Kong's major leaders are either appointed by the Crown or subject
to its approval [71]. They, in turn, appoint the members of the colony's two
principal governing bodies, the Legislative Council and the Executive Council
[72].
The Agreement provides that H6ng Kong's future government will be more
democratic. The Hong Kong SAR will have a legislature consisting of elected
local inhabitants [73], and the executive authorities will be accountable to it
[74]. According to Deng Xiaoping, however, only local inhabitants who are
"patriots" will hold government positions [75]. A patriot has "respect for his
own nation, earnest and sincere support for the motherland's resumption of its
sovereignty over Hong Kong" [76] and will refrain "from harming the stability
and prosperity of Hong Kong" [77]. Nevertheless, Deng stated that "a patriot
may adhere to any political ideology" [78].
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Observers question China's promise to establish a democratic government.
For instance, the description of the selection process for the Hong Kong SAR's
chief executive is unduly open-ended [79]. The Agreement states that the chief
executive will be "selected by election or through consultations held locally
and be appointed by the Central People's Government" [801. It does not
specify, therefore, whether local citizens will elect their chief executive or
whether his selection will require Chinese approval [81].
The scope of the chief executive's power is also unclear. He or she may not
appoint any of his or her principal officials, but may only nominate them. The
Central People's Government will appoint the SAR's principal officers [82].
Furthermore, the Agreement does not explain how the executive authorities
will be accountable to the legislature [83]. China does not guarantee that
legislative elections will be competitive [84]. Thus, the actual structure of Hong
Kong's government after 1997 remains a mystery.
Hong Kong's government has traditionally avoided major intervention to
correct market forces in the economy [85]. Commentators have described Hong
Kong's economic policy was "laissez-faire" [86]. Nevertheless, the government
has maintained a policy of "discreet guidance" of the economy [87].
Although the government has not influenced the economy by establishing
minimum wage laws or by creating tax concessions for capital investiment, it
has exercised some influence through its monopoly over land ownership [88].
Recently, the Hong Kong government found it necessary to increase its
intervention in the economy. Because of a series of budget deficits, the Hong
Kong government decided to issue debt in 1984 for the first time since 1975
[89]. The devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar, engendered by uncertainty
over Hong Kong's political future, forced the government to raise its banks'
reserve requirements and peg the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar in order
to stabilize the currency [90]. Furthermore, the government is considering the
funding of electronic research to reduce the start-up costs of electronics firms
[91], a step it would not have taken in the past.
Despite business concern that a democratic government might interfere
more in Hong Kong's economy than does the present government, there has
never been any guarantee that the present government would continue its
policy of minimal governmental interference. Sir Christopher Howe, in his
assessment of Hong Kong's economy, declared that "[i]n the longer run
consideration will have to be given both to a raising direct taxes and to
borrowing" [92]. Hong Kong's public sector will probably grow in importance
because of current programs for new towns, housing, and social services [93].
These programs could not be curtailed without "severe social and political
consequences" [94]. Howe's predictions are materializing faster than even he
expected. In February, 1984, for example, Hong Kong's income tax was raised
from fifteen percent to seventeen percent [95]. Thus, business in Hong Kong
will likely continue to face the threat of increased taxation whatever the future
structure of Hong Kong's government.
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5. Hong Kong's legal system
The legal traditions of Hong Kong and China differ markedly. Hong
Kong's legal system is an outgrowth of England's common law tradition [961,
which is characterized by the resolution of adversarial disputes through the
procedures of the courts. In contrast, "[tihe notion of guiding major economic
relationships through the enactment of legal principles and rules, applied if
necessary by courts in adversarial proceedings, has been aline to the experience
of most Chinese" [97].
In China, for example, during the period of 1957 to 1965, the bulk of civil
disputes were resolved by "conciliation committees" rather than by an inde-
pendent judiciary [98]. During most of the period of the Cultural Revolution
and the Gang of Four, 1966 to 1976 [99], the Chinse government was hostile to
the law, lawyers, and courts [1001. Only within the past seven years has China
sought to strengthen its legal system through resumption of legislative activity
and adoption of codes [101].
Many, including the Chinese, recognize that Hong Kong's existing common
law system has been partially responsible for Hong Kong's success. "Hong
Kong observers maintain that the colony's prosperity as a center of free
enterprise depends as much on the framework of British law and administra-
tion as it does on the hard work of the overwhelmingly Chinese population or
of the millions of dollars brought in by outside investors" [102]. While China
has downplayed the importance of British rule in Hong Kong's success [103], it
has acknowledged that "some" of Britain's policies have "played a role" in
Hong Kong's prosperity [104].
Business leaders fear that China will abandon Hong Kong's legal system in
favor of the one presently existing in China [105]. The Agreement addresses
doubts surrounding Hong Kong's future legal system by specifying that
China's National People's Congress will enact a "Basic Law" for the Hong
Kong SAR [106].
The Agreement also provides that "[t]he courts shall exercise judicial power
independently and free from any interference" [107], and possess the power of
final adjudication [108]. The courts will make decisions based on the Hong
Kong SAR's laws [109], and precedents in other common law jurisdictions
[110], rather than the laws of China. The Hong Kong SAR may make its own
provisions for "local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong [SAR]
to work and practise in" Hong Kong [111].
Some commentators have questioned the Agreement's ptovisions concerning
Hong Kong's legal system [112]. Doubts have centered on the provision for the
Basic Law. Such coubts continue despite Deng Xiaoping's assertion that
because the Basic Law will be based on the Agreement, "[d]rawing up laws
based on accord is an easy matter" [113]. No provision exists for either Hong
Kong or the United Kingdom to approve the contents of the Basic Law or to
amend the Basic Law [114].
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The Agreement is also silent on whose interpretation of the Basic Law will
prevail. If Hong Kong's independent judiciary consistently interpret the Basic
Law in a way that is at odds with Chinese policies, the mainland government
could conceivably intervene. It could also prevent such an occurrence by
influencing the SAR's chief executive to appoint judges sympathetic to its own
policies [115]. Confusion over the status of the Basic Law is compounded by
predictions that a draft of the Basic Law will not be completed before 1990
[116]. Thus, uncertainty over the actual legal framework to be implemented in
Hong Kong in 1997 will probably continue.
6. Hong Kong business interests affected by the Agreement
6.1. Hong Kong's financial markets
Hong Kong has been described as the third largest financial center in the
world [117]. It has emerged as the fourth largest gold market after London,
Zurich, and New York [118]. At least seventy percent of all banks in Hong
Kong are foreign banks [119]. Locally-owned Hong Kong banks have ex-
panded their international operations [120]. As Hong Kong's economy has
expanded [121], employment in Hong Kong's financial sector has increased
[122].
During negotiation of the Agreement, some Hong Kong business leaders
expressed concerns over Hong Kong's status as an international financial
center under Chinese administration [123]. These concerns centered on the
future of the Hong Kong dollar and on the openness of Hong Kong's foreign
exchange markets [124]. Ronald Li, chairman of the Far East Exchange Ltd.,
the largest and most active of Hong Kong's four stock exchanges, remarked
that "[t]he openness of the foreign exchange markets and the free convertibility
of the dollar are keys to Hong Kong's commercial success" [125]. The inability
to exchange the Hong Kong dollar in international currency markets would
cripple Hong Kong's status as an international financial center.
The Agreement's response to the above concerns is a guarantee that "[t]he
Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, shall continue to circulate and
remain freely convertible" [126]. Moreover, the Agreement directs the govern-
ment of the Hong Kong SAR to "safeguard the free operation of financial
business and the free flow of capital within, into and out of" the Hong Kong
SAR [127].
6.2. International trade and shipping
This subsection examines the trade and manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong and the Agreement's likely effect on them. These industries were chosen
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specifically because Hong Kong is one of the most important trade and
manufacturing centers in the world. It is the largest net exporter of textiles in
the world [128], the fifteenth largest importer of manufactured goods [129], and
a larger overall importer than South Africa, Mexico, Norway, or New Zealand
[130.
Victoria Harbor has facilitated Hong Kong's mercantile success. Located
between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula [131], the harbor's
position as China's only deep-water port initially attracted British traders in
the nineteenth century [132]. Hong Kong's port presently offers the world's
second largest container capacity [133] and houses ten percent of the world's
fleet of ships [134]. In addition to its location "at a major junction of the
world's shipping lanes, and at Asia's commercial heart" [135], Hong Kong's
port attracts shipowners because Hong Kong offers them certain commercial
advantages [136].
A preeminent concern of traders and manufacturers is the degree to which
Hong Kong will become embroiled in China's foreign policy after 1997.
Traders have been atracted to Hong Kong in part because of its relative
political neutrality in Asia [137]. Traders have profited by using Hong Kong as
an intermediary port through which they can channel goods between states
that have erected trade barriers. Trade disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia
and between South Korea and Japan, at times, have forced trade between these
countries to be conducted through Hong Kong [138]. Some traders fear that
China will not allow Hong Kong to retain such status in the future. They are
concerned that China will involve Hong Kong in its own foreign politics, for
example by forbidding trade with the Soviets or Israelis [139].
Hong Kong traders also question whether states antagonistic to China will
accord Hong Kong businessmen the same treatment once they have become
Chinese subjects [140]. Hong Kong's future relationship with Taiwan is of
particular concern to these business interests because Hong Kong is Taiwan's
third largest market for exports [141]. Some fear that Taiwan will sever its
business ties with Hong Kong as part of Taiwan's policy of "non-dialogue";
with China [142].
A corollary to the issue of Hong Kong's future role in China's foreign
affairs is the question of whether China will force Hong Kong to become a
party to international agreements to which China is a party [143]. In addition,
business leaders hope that China will permit Hong Kong to adhere to those
international agreements to which it is already a party, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) [144].
The Agreement addresses potential problems that could affect Hong Kong's
international trade. In addition to its guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will
retain the status of a free port [145], it assures shipowners that "[p]rivate
shipping business and shipping-related business and private container termi-
nals in Hong Kong may continue to operate freely" [146]. Moreover, all ships,
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except foreign warships, will be permitted to use Hong Kong's port in
accordance with the Hong Kong SAR's laws [147].
Shipowners will be among the first to benefit under the Agreement's
provisions for Hong Kong's autonomy. British shipping regulations govern
ships presently registered in Hong Kong [148]. Hong Kong's status as a colony
has hampered shippers' ability to express their concerns in international
forums [149]. Citing the Agreement's provision that the Hong Kong SAR may
"maintain a shipping register and issue related certificates under its own
legislation" [150], ship owners recently pressed for the establishment of Hong
Kong's own shipping register [151]. The present British governor has interpre-
ted this position as consistent with the Agreement [152].
The Hong Kong SAR will have considerable autonomy to enter into
international agreements [153]. The Agreement permits the Hong Kong SAR
to "participate in relevant international organisations and international trade
agreements (including preferential trade arrangements) such as the GATT and
arrangements regarding international trade in textiles" [154]. The Agreement
pledges that trade arrangements negotiated by the Hong Kong SAR will apply
only to the Hong Kong SAR and not to other areas of China [155].
The Hong Kong SAR will have limited autonomy, however, in the field of
international affairs. The Agreement specifies that "foreign affairs" are the
responsibility of China [1561. Because the conduct of foreign affairs involves
more than national defense [157], China could conceivably intervene in inter-
national agreements that the Hong Kong SAR negotiates with other states. The
Agreement also indicates that international agreements to which China is a
signatory may also be applied to the Hong Kong SAR [158]. China's National
People's Congress will decide which agreements will apply to the Hong Kong
SAR, although the Congress will solicit the SAR's views before making such a
decision [159].
7. Concerns about the Agreement's implementation
The Agreement's responses to the concerns of Hong Kong business leaders
has not eliminated doubts about Beijing's ultimate intentions. Some observers
suggest that no matter what China promises, the fears of the Hong Kong
business community cannot be allayed [160]. Nevertheless, observers have
proffered several theories for Beijing's willingness not only to accept the terms
of the Agreement but also to continue to adhere to its promises once it regains
sovereignty over Hong Kong [161].
One argument advanced as evidence that China will adhere to the Agree-
ment is that Deng Xiaoping and his prot6g6s are pragmatists who are willing to
subordinate ideological concerns to more practical, economic ones [162].
According to Deng: "Some people have asked whether China's policy towards
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Hong Kong will be changed. I replied there is no reason to change it. No good
will come from changing it" [163]. Yet Deng's assurances fall short of an
explicit promise to honor the Agreement. The key factor, according to Deng, is
whether the policy is "correct" [164]. He has not specified who will decide the
"correctness" of China's policy, nor has he indicated the standard to be
applied. Although Deng apparently has sought to allay the fears of the
business community, his reassurances have failed to do so [165].
Even assuming Deng should continue his current policies, it is unlikely that
the eighty-year-old leader will rule China in 1997 [166]. While Deng has
prepared his proteges, Premier Zhao Ziyang and Communist Party Secretary
Hu Yaobang, to continue his policies upon his death or retirement [167], no
one can be certain either successor will be in charge of China in 1997. They
certainly will not be guiding China's Hong Kong policy for the entire fifty-year
period of the Agreement.
Deng faces internal opposition from a number of sources [168]. He will
continue to encounter resistance from China's military leadership because of
his de-emphasis of the military's role in Chinese society [169]. Moreover,
certain elements of the Chinese Communist Party and the bureaucracy, who
view Deng's pragmatic reforms as a betrayal of China's socialist system,
remain a viable threat to the policies of the Deng era [170]. Responding to one
of Deng's recent proposals for the sale of shares of stock of companies in
China, one finance ministry official lamented that most officials in the pro-
vinces still regard shares as "a betrayal of socialism and a reversion to the
capitalism of the past" [171]. Deng has recently called for older members of
both the military and the Communist Party to step down from their positions
of authority in order to make room for younger, less doctrinaire leaders [172],
but it is too early to determine if such efforts will reduce opposition to his
reforms.
The importance of Hong Kong to Deng's modernization program may
reinforce his intention to honor the Agreement. China hopes to quadruple its
Gross Domestic Product between 1980 and 2000 [173]. An ambitious develop-
ment program in the 1980s, which envisions access to foreign capital and
technology via Hong Kong, might lead to real economic growth in the 1990s
[1741. China's related desire to regain sovereignty over Taiwan provides further
incentive to adhere to the Agreement. The successful integration of Hong
kong's capitalist economy into Deng's scheme of Chinese socialism may reduce
Taiwanese resistance to Chinese overtures [175].
Observers point to increased trade ties between China and Hong Kong as
proof of China's commitment to Hong Kong's success [176]. As discussed
above, however, China's continued emphasis upon orderly economic growth
cannot be guaranteed [177].
Some commentators argue that China, with a history of honoring past
international agreements, will honor this one [178]. Although China repudiated
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the original Hong Kong treaties, it still continued to honor their terms.
According to these commentators, China's tolerance was requisite to Hong
Kong's economic success [1791. Nevertheless, reliance on past Chinese ad-
herence to international agreements, by itself, will not engender confidence in
this Agreement. As Wesley-Smith points out: "There is a difference involving
international agreements and one in which China commits herself to an
agreement concerning its own territory over which it is sovereign" [180]. China.
under the guise of national sovereignty, could theoretically adopt any number
of alternative policies toward Hong Kong. Moreover, the Agreement itself is
sufficiently ambiguous so that China could justify almost any of its actions as
being consistent with the Agreement [181].
8. Conclusion
The Sino-British Agreement is a remarkable document in that it represents
two nations' attempt to unify a capitalist system, Hong Kong, with its socialist
motherland. Because of the Agreement's need to maintain a delicate balance
between diverging interests, it has necessarily lacked specificity. Although
China and Great Britain expressed satisfaction with the Agreement, its inher-
ent ambiguity has proved to be a source of dissatisfaction for Hong Kong
business leaders and independent observers.
Several factors exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong's future.
Deng Xiaoping's widely publicized "one country, two systems" policy, for
example, may prove to be unsuccessful. Moreover, there are no assurances that
Deng's successors will continue to adhere to this policy, which is crucial to
Hong Kong's success. Finally, as long as details regarding the Agreement's
implementation remain unknown, uncertainty will continue to characterize
Hong Kong's future.
The Agreement may raise as many questions as it attempts to resolve. This
may not necessarily harm the colony's economic success, however. Under the
Chinese policy of national reunification, Hong Kong's economy may burgeon
as China opens its markets to the West.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss2/3
T.S. MacIntyre / Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong
Notes
[1] The Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of
Hong Kong, 1984 Misc. No. 20 [hereinafter cited as Agreement]. The Agreement contains four
official parts: A Joint Declaration and Three Annexes, all of which are equally binding. The
Draft Agreement also contains an introduction and explanation of the British Government's
view of the negotiations and terms of the Agreement.
[2) See infra text accompanying notes 7-44.
[3] See infra text accompanying notes 45-67.
[4] See infra text accompanying notes 68-116.
[5] See infra text accompanying notes 117-59.
[6] See infra text accompanying notes 160-81.
[7] Howe, Growth, Public Policy and Hong Kong's Economic Relationship with China, 95 China Q.
512, 512 (1983); see Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 14, 1984, at 9, col. 1
[8] Pye, The International Position of Hong Kong, 95 China Q. 456, 456 (1983).
[9] Pye, supra note 8, at 456; Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1; id., June 13.
1984, at 11, col. 3.
[101 Pye, supra note 8, at 456.
[11] Id.
[12] Comment, The Legal Implications of the Sino-British Treaties Regarding Hong Kong, 4 Loy.
L.A: Int'l & Comp. .J. 110, 112 (1981); see Howe, supra note 7, at 512-15.
[13] Comment, supra note 12, at 111; Howe, supra note 7, at 512-17.
[14] A country's "Domestic Product" is what American ecnomists refer to as "National Product."
Thus, the Domestic Product is equivalent to Net National Product and Gross Domestic
Product is analogous to Gross National Product. See Howe, supra note 7, at 512-13.
[15] Howe, supra note 7, at 512. This performance was topped only by the growth rates of Libya,
Iran, and Japan.
[16] Id. at 515, 520.
[17] Id. at 515.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 517-19.
[201 Id. at 519-22.
[21] Id at 520-21.
122] Id. at 512.
[23] See generally G. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-60 (1978) (general
military, economic, and political history of British relations with China during the initial
colonization of Hong Kong); J. Williamson, A Short History of British Expansion: The
Modem Empire and Commonwealth (5th ed. 1964) (historical view of relations between China
and Great Britain during British imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); P.
Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997: China, Great Britain, and Hong Kong's New
Territories (1980) (detailed examination of the 1898 Convention which resulted in the ninety-
nine year lease on the New Terrotories).
[24] Confucian philosophy stressed social, political, and economic harmony through a focus on
man's virtues. The leaders of China were men who sought to avoid hostilities through a process
of negotiation and compromise. This philosophy was the basis of China's legal system and
subsequently proved ineffective against the aggressive imperialism of Europe. See Tay, Law in
Communist China - Part I, 6 Sydney L. Rev. 154, 155-62 (1969).
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[25] China was first opened to European trade in the eighteenth century when Europe recognized
the trade value of Chinese products, particularly silk and tea. At the outset, the trade was
favorable to China since the British had no export commodity for which there was a Chinese
demand. Britain, however, eliminated its Chinese trade deficit in the 1830s when it began
exporting a product of high demand to China - opium. Comment, supra note 12, at 111-12;
Government Information Series, Hong Kong [1979] 231 (1979); Endacott, A History of Hong
Kong 4-13 (2d ed. 1973).
[26] Endacott, supra note 25, at 14; Comment, supra note 12, at 112. See generally P. Fay, The
Opium War 1840-1842 (1975); G. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-1860
(1978).
[271 Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, Great Britain-China, Brit. For., XXX, 389, 93 Parry's T.S.
465, see also Endacott, supra note 25, at 22-25.
[28] Convention of Peking, Oct. 24, 1860, Great Britain-China, Brit. For., L, 10. 123 Party's T.S.
72; see also Comment, supra note 12, at 113.
[29] Convention of 1898, June 9, 1898, Great Britain-China, Brit. For., XC, 17, 186 Parry's T.S.
310; see also Wesley-Smith, supra note 23, passim.
[30] See generally P. Fay, supra note 26.
[31] Mao sought to isolate China from the world in order to purge elements of Western
imperialism from Chinese society and to transform the country into a communist state. Even
though Chinese economic policies changed focus throughout his reign, Mao sought to use the
masses to reorder social institutions. Through constant upheaval, Mao sought to instill China
with his values of selflessness and the virtues of serving the collective. Comment, supra note 12,
at 111-13. See generally Van Ness & Raichur, Dilemmas of Socialist Development: An Analysis
of Strategic Lives in China, in China from Mao to Deng: The Politics and Economics of
Socialist Development 81-62 (Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars ed. 1983) (examination of
Communist rule in China from historical and economic perspectives).
[32] See Van Ness & Raichur, supra note 31, at 113.
[33] Deng's new course for China can be viewed as a reaction against the policies of Mao,
especially the policies enacted during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). The Cultural Revolu-
tion began as Mao's attempt to revitalize class struggle in order to press Chinese society
towards communism. The movement was soon submerged into a mass movement to maintain
Mao's power by removing his opponents from power. When Mao died, the factions which were
struggling for power within the party were brought to public notice. One group, led by Mao's
widow Jiang Qing, and known as the "Gang of Four," sought to continue Mao's policies of
mass politics and to oppose any westernization of China's economy. The other group, China's
current leadership, was led by Deng, who had been disgraced by Mao during the Cultural
Revolution and subsequently rehabilitated. Ard. at 80-82.
[34] Id., see also China's New Development Strategy (J. Gray & G. White eds. 1982) (survey of
new directions in Chinese development policy in the post-Mao era by British scholars).
[351 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang summarized the new pragmatism in the Four Modernizations
by stating: "We should adopt whatever system, structure, policy and method are most effective
in promoting the development of the productive forces." Beijing Rev., Nov. 23, 1979, at 3.
[36] Initially, in 1979, China set up four Special Economic Zones: Shenzhen, near Hong Kong;
Zhuhai, near Macau; Shanfou, in the Guangdong prdvince; and Ziamer, in the Fujian province.
J. Com., Apr. 24, 1984, at 1A, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 27, 1984, at 39, col. 2.
[37] Wall St. J., June 27, 1984, at 39, col. 2.
[38] Id. Of the four zones, Shenzhen has been the most successful in luring the largest amount of
foreign investiment. Located near Hong Kong, Shenzhu has been transformed from a small
village into a modern city. Beijing Rev., Dec. 3, 1984, at 19.
[39] Id. These cities will be granted decision-making autonomy similar to that given the existing
zones.
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[40) Of the new cities opened to foreign investiment, several large industrial cities such as
Chongqing, Canton, and Shansai have been included. See, e.g. Wall St. J.. Sept. 5, 1984. at 36.
col. 1 (Chongqing, an industrial city in the Sechuan province, increased its industrial and
agricultural output to 5.5 billion dollars in 1983, an 11% increase from 1982). Beijing Rev.,
Nov. 19, 1984, at 23 (Quangzhou, another example of China's new open policy, has already
attracted 1.1 billion dollars of foreign investment).
[411 A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA in People's China and
International Law 379-81 (J. Cohen & H. Chu eds. 1974); Beijing Rev., Oct. 17. 1983. at 13:
id., Oct. 11, 1982, at 10. See generally Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufference: Some Legal
Aspects of the Status of Hong Kong, 95 China Q. 427 (1983).
[42] Dicks, supra note 41, at 435-36, 439-40.
[43] Beijing Rev., Oct. 10, 1983, at 10.
[44] Id., Howe, supra note 7, at 457.
[45] The climate of uncertainty that prevailed during the negotiation process produced a number
of dislocations in Hong Kong's economy. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange, for example.
declined from 1300 on the Hang Seng stock index in mid-1982 to below 700 in December of
1982. Pye, supra note 8, at 460 n.14. Hong Kong currently has four stock markets: the Hong
Kong, the Far East, the Kam Ngan, and Kowloon exchanges. Plans exist for their consolida-
tion into one exchange sometime in 1985. See Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 25, col.4.
During this period of uncertainty, property values declined. Id. The press reported that some
wealthy Hong Kong residents transferred their assets abroad or even emigrated. Christian Sci.
Monitor, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1; see also id., June 13, 1984, at 11, col.3.
[46] See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
[47) Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14.
[48] Id.
[49) Id. China's Constitution specifies that "the state may establish special administrative regions
when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be
prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific
conditions." Constitution of the People's Reoublic of China art. 31, reprinted in Beijing Rev.,
Dec. 27, 1982, at 10, 16.
[50] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14.
[51] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VI, at 17.
[52] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14.
[53] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. II, at 15.
(54] Id. ("[L]aws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e., the common law, rules of equity,
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained save for any that
contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong (SAR) legislature.")
[55] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VII, at 18.
[56) Id. Outside parties may not be as interested in dealing with Hong Kong. In 1974, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange established an international futures trading link with the
Singapore International Monetary Exchange. Hong Kong was among several Asian exchanges
considered but not chosen. Cf. Telephone interview with Dr. Clayton Yeutter, President,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Feb. 28, 1985) ("A significant factor in our decision to deal with
Singapore rather than Hong Kong was the political uncertainty. We look forward to a long
term relationship; Hong Kong might not have been able to give us that.") Telephone interview
on file at this Journal.
[57] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VII, at 18.
[581 Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VI, at 17.
[59) The Agreement permits the Hong Kong SAR to "maintain and develop relations and
conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisa-
tions in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping,
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communications, touristic, cultural and sporting fields." Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art.
XI, at 20-21. In addition, the Hong Kong SAR may participate as a member of China's
delegation in organizations that allow only states to be members. Id. at 21.
[60] For a discussion of recent taxation in Hong Kong, see infra text accompanying notes 85-95.
[61] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. V, at 17.
[62] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VI, at 17.
[63] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. XIII, at 22. See also Agreement, supra note 1, annex
I, art. XIV, at 22-23, which discusses the Hong Kong SAR's power to issue passports and other
travel documents.
[64] Christian Si. Monitqr, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1.
[65] See, e.g., Big Business Sees Profit In a Chinese Flag Over Hong Kong, Bus. Week, Oct. 8,
1984, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Big Business]. American investment increased in 1983 by 10%
to $3.3 billion. Japanese investment during the same year climbed by 41% to $2.3 billion.
[66] See, e.g., Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col.1.
[67] See, e.g. Big Business, supra note 65, at 55; Hong Kong: Economic Outlook is Bright Despite
Political Uncertainty, Bus. America, Aug. 20, 1983, at 41-42; As China Frees Its Economy,
Hong Kong Traders Aim to Develop Middleman Role, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 24, 1984,
col. 1, at 5.
[681 Wilson, How Hong Kong May Come to Terms with Communism, Banker, Dec. 1983, at 27,
31-32.
[69] Id.
[70] Hook, The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition, 95 China Q. 491 (1983).
[71] See id. at 494.
[72] See id at 491.
[73] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14.
[74] Id.
[75 Beijing Rev., July 23, 1984, at 16-17.
[76] Id.
[771 Id.
[78] Id.
[79] Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 22, 1984, at 18, col. I (editorial by Harry Harding, a senior
fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution) [hereinafter cited as
Harding].
[80] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art.I, at 14.
[81] Id.
[82] Id.
[83] Harding, supra note 79, at 18, col. 1.
[84] Id.
[85] See Howe, supra note 7, at 521-22.
[86] A. Hicks, Business and the Law, in The Buriness Environment in Hong Kong 234, 257 (D.
Lethbridge ed. 1980).
[87] Id. at 258 (quoting R. Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place - Borrowed Time (1976)).
[88] Chen, The Economic Setting, in The Business Environment in Hong Kong, 33 (D. Lethbridge
ed. 1980).
[89] Int'l Currency Rev., Sept. 1984, at 115, 118; Hong Kong Dollar to Stay Pegged to U.S.
Currency, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 10, 1984, col. 1, at 18.
[90] See Hong Kong: An Investor's Chronicle Survey, Investor's Chron., Nov. 25, 1983, at i, iii.
[91] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 11, col 1.
[92] Howe, supra note 7, at 526.
[93) Id. at 529.
[94] Id.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss2/3
T.S. Maclntyre / Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong
[95] Int'l Currency Rev., supra note 89m at 118 (the first adjustment in Hing Kong's income tax
rate since 1966).
[96] See Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. II, at 15.
[97] Edwards, The Future of U.S.-China Trade and Investment - The Legal and Economic
Climate, in Business Transactions with China, Japan, and South Korea 1-1, 1-6 (P. Saney & H.
Smit eds. 1983).
[98] Report Prepared by the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress For the Use of the
Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong. 1st Sess. 4 n.21 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Report].
[991 The Gang of Four refers to the group of four people, including Mao Zedong's wife, who
seized power towards the end of Mao's leadership. This group was responsible for killing and
imprisoning a countless number of people, particularly artists and intellectuals in the "anti-
rightest" backlash of the Cultural Revolution. See Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China Without Mao
24-25 (1982).
[100] 1984 Report, supra note 98, at 5.
[101] Id.
[102] Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 23, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
[1031 See e.g., Beijing Rev., Sept. 26, 1983, at 14, 18 (the author of this article wrote: "people may
ask if British rule had such a magical effect why so many other British-administered areas in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America which were under British rule for decades or even hundreds of
years remain in poverty and backwardness without much change even to this day"); see also
Benton, The Hong Kong Crisis 19 (1983). (Presently, under British rule, there is tremendous
inequality in Hong Kong with at least half a million people living in "appalling poverty.")
(104] Beijing Rev., Oct. 10, 1983, at 10, 11.
[105] Goodstadt, Is China Turning Capitalist?, Euromoney, Oct. 1984, at 18. For example, one
businessman voiced his company's concern: "I don't think it's generally known that China
doesn't have a company law; nobody knows what kind of corporate legal framework will exist
in Hong Kong after 1997." Id. Maintenance of an independent judiciary may also be crucial to
business confidence in Hong Kong, and remains an unresolved issue raised by the Agreement.
Wilson, supra note 68, at 28.
[106] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14.
[107] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. III, at 15.
[108] Id. Currently, final adjudication of disputes in Hong Kong lies with the British House of
Lords. For an excellent synopsis of Hong Kong's current governmental structure see Hook,
The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition, 95 China Q. 491 (1983).
[109] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. III, at 15.
[1101 Id.
[111} Id.
[112] The Economist, Dec. 1, 1984, at 43, 44 ("[N]early a quarter of Hong Kong's 220 barristers
have declined to endorse the agreement.").
[113] Beijing Rev., Oct. 22, 1984, at 6.
[1141 See Harding, supra note 79, at 18, col. 1.
[1151 It is unclear what influence China will retain over the chief executive of the Hong Kong SAIL
Id.
[1161 The Economist, supra note 112, at 43.
[117] Pye, supra note 8, at 456; Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1; id., June 13,
1984, at 11, col. 3.
[118] Wilson, supra note 68, at 27, 31-32.
[119] Howe, supra note 7, at 518.
[1201 Id.
[121] A recent survey of the world's economies rated Hong Kong as the fourth best-performing
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developing country in the world after Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia. In the past ten years,
Hong Kong has had the fourth fastest-growing economy, with its Gross Domestic Product
growing an average of 7.6% annually, after Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. See Across the
Globe, Economic Growth Perks Up, Euromoney, Oct. 1984, at 290.
[122] Howe, supra note 7, at 515 (noting that employment in the financial sector, as well as in
government, trade, and services grew at an average og eight percent during the years 1977-1983
because of the rapid growth in banking, the financial sector, property, and tourism).
[123] Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1.
[124] Id.
[125] Id.
[126] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VII, at 18.
[1271 Id.
[128] Wilson, supra note 68, at 31
[129] Id.
[130] Id
[131] G. Benton, supra note 103, at 19; Baker, Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong
Man, 95 China Q. 469 (1983); Investors' Chron., supra note 90, at x; Beijing Rev., Oct. 10,
1983, at 10, 11; Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 8, 1980, at 11, ol. 1.
[132] See Benton, supra note 103, at 19; Baker, supra note 131, at 469.
[133] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
[134] Id.
[135] Benton, supra note 103, at 19.
[136] Shipowners are attracted to Hong Kong's port because, unlike many European ports, Hong
Kong only applies duties to ships that use its port. Consequently, ships are not taxed on profits
earned outside of Hong Kong. Shipowners, seeking to reduce crew costs, are also attracted to
Hong Kong because of the absence of strong labor unions. See Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984,
at 10, col. 1; Wilson, supra note 68, at 32.
[137] See Wilson, supra note 68, at 31.
[138] Id.
[139] See id. at 27.
[140] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
[141] Id.
[142] Id.
[143] Dicks, supra note 41, at 440 n. 47.
[144] See id. at 438-39.
[1451 Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VI, at 17.
[146] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VIII, at 18.
[147] Id.
[148] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
[149] See id. (For example, Helmut Sohmen, vice chairman of Worldwide Shipping, one of Hong
Kong's largest shipping concerns, recently observed: "We are one of the world's biggest
shipping centers... .But we have had to express our views in international circles through other
governments.")
[150] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VIII, at 18.
[151] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1. Shipowners desire an independent register so
that they may control their own interests, particularly so they may establish a fully autonomous
shipping industry before China assumes sovereign power. Id. Shipowners feel that a break
from London now will justify an independent register in 1997. Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1984,
at 8, col. 4.
[152] Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1984, at. 8, col. 4.
[153] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. XI, at 20-21.
214
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss2/3
T.S. Maclntyre / Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong
[1541 Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. VI, at 17.
[155] See id.
[156] Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14. China's authority over Hong Kong's foreign
affairs will determine which states may maintain consular and other official missions in Hong
Kong. For example, a state with diplomatic ties to China may establish a mission in the Hong
Kong SAR. Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. XI, at 21. If a state does not have
diplomatic ties with China, however, then the Agreement indicates that individual "cir-
cumstances" will determine whether that state will be permitted to have a mission in Hong
Kong. Id. The Agreement does not specify what "circumstances" must be taken into account.
Importantly, a state not recognized by China cannot establish official ties with the Hong Kong
SAR. Id. This provision of the Agreement will no doubt have considerable effect upon Hong
Kong's relations with Taiwan, which China does not recognize as a state. The exact language is
"[s]tates not recognized by [China] can only establish non-governmental institutions." Id. Thus,
unoffocial trade relationships between individual importers in Hong Kong and exporters in
Taiwan may not be adversely affected by this provision.
[157] See Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, at 14. (China reserves to itself the areas of
"foreign and defence affairs" indicating that these will be considered separately.)
[158 Agreement, supra note 1, annex I, art. XI, at 21.
[1591 See id.
[160] Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 27, 1984, at 32, col. 2; id., Aug. 24, 1984, at 9, col. 1; id., Aug.
2, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
[1611 See infra text accompanying notes 162-81.
[162] See Pye, supra note 8, at 463.
[163 Beijing Rev., Oct. 15, 1984, at 6.
[164] Id., July 23, 1984, at 16.
[165] See Pye, supra note 8, at 463.
[166] Id. at 457.
[167] See Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1984, at 11, col. 2.
[168] Newsom, A Glimpse of China, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 3, 1982, at 22, col. 2.
[169) Id.
[170] Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 21, 1984, at 1, col. 3; id., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 3; id., Oct. 17,
1984, at 9, col. 3; id., Aug. 3, 1982, at 22, col. 2.
[171] Goodstadt, supra note 105, at 18.
[172] Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 27, 1984, at 13, col. 3 (Deng called on the country's aging
leadership to step aside for a new generation); id., Nov. 6, 1984, at 9, col. 1 (Deng said he
wanted a new generation of military leaders who are "more open-minded" and called on the
armed forces to give their full support to the reforms announced at the Communist Party
plenum).
[1731 Staff of House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., United States Trade
Relations with China and Japan 5 (Comm. Print 1983).
[174 Id., see also Int'l Currency Rev., supra note 89, at 116; Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 8, 1980,
at 11, col. 1. One reason Hong Kong may be important to China is that China obtains between
25 and 40% of its foreign currency through Hong Kong. Pye, supra note 8, at 461. By
establishing subsidiaries of its Bank of China in Hong Kong, it has obtained Hong Kong
dollars and other foreign currencies. However, China has begun establishing branches of its
Bank of China in cities such as New York and London, indicating China may be seeking to be
less dependent on Hong Kong as a source of foreign exchange. See Int'l Currency Rev., supra
note 89, at 116.
[175] Pye, supra note 8, at 464-65; Chai, Good for Hong Kon&7 Wrong for Taiwan, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Oct. 22, 1984, at 18, col. 3 (editorial by Trong R. Chai) [hereinafter cited as Chail; An
Zhiguo, A Red-Letter Day for China, Beijing Review, Oct. 1, 1984, at 9, col. 2; Deciding Hong
Kong's Future, Christian Sci. Monitor, March 12, 1984, at 12, col. 1 (editorial). One observer
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has noted that "There is every reason to believe that the formula of 'one country, two systems'
will have a significant bearing on the eventual coming together of the mainland and Taiwan."
Beijing Rev., Oct. 1, 1984, at 4. The "one country, two systems" concept refers to the uniting of
Hong Kong's capitalist system and Beijing's socialist system under one sovereign government.
Id. Indeed, China's Premier Zhao Ziyang appealed to Taiwan for consultations shortly after
details of the Agreement were released. Chai, at 18, cq. 3. Officials in Taiwan have refused to
accept Beijing's overtures and to recognize any Sino-British agreement to relinquish Hong
Kong to the Chinese. The Times (London), Aug. 3, 1984, at 6, col. 1. Taiwan's Foreign Minister
described the Agreement as "another trick in China's peace offensive against Taiwan."
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 5, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
[176] See Howe, supra note 7, at 529-32; Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 8, 1980, at 11, col. 1.
[177] Pye, supra note 8, at 457.
[178] See Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 3. For example, Sir Geoffrey Howe has
noted: "I think one of the features which is most noteworthy about the position of China and
the Chinese government is the respect which it shows for international agreements." Id. Peter
Wesley-Smith, one of Hong Kong's leading legal scholars, observed that he could not "think of
any treaty China has not complied with that it's signed." Id. at 32, col. 3. But see Chai, supra
note 175, at 18, col. 3. In a 1951 agreement, China promised not to interfere in Tibet's political
system. Eight years later China invaded Tibet and has since suppressed the Tibetan culture,
polity, and life-style.
[179] See e.g.., Harsch, The Cost of Empires, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 22, 1982, ar 23, col. 1.
[180] Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 2, 1984, at 32, col. 3.
[181] For a discussion concerning Chinese reservation of the conduct of foreign affairs to itself, see
supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
Thomas Maclntyre is a third year law student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
He is a graduate of Houghton College (B.A.).
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